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God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
Courage to change the things I can,
And wisdom to know the difference.
– Reinhold Niebuhr
1 Introduction
Start with two questions:
1. Suppose that you care only about speaking the truth, and are confident
that some particular deterministic theory is true. If someone asks
you whether that theory is true (and you must answer either “yes” or
“no”) are you rationally required to answer “yes”?
2. Suppose that you face a problem in which (as in Newcomb’s problem)
one of your options—call it “taking two boxes”—causally dominates
your only other option—call it “taking one box”.1 Are you rationally
required to take two boxes?
Those of us attracted to causal decision theory are under pressure to answer
“yes” to both questions. The first “yes” seems obvious, even prior to
commitments to any particular decision theory. And the second “yes”
reflects a core commitment of causal decision theory.
It has been shown that many existing decision theories are inconsistent
with answering “yes” to both questions (Ahmed 2014a, §5, §7, Ahmed 2014b,
§5.2.1). My aim is to give a simple proof that the same goes for an even
wider class of theories: all “suppositional” decision theories (according to
1In other words: There is a proposition—call it “million-present”—whose truth value
is settled and is outside of your causal influence. Furthermore you regard million-present
scenarios in which you take two boxes as better than million-present scenarios in which
you take just one box, and the same goes for no-million-present scenarios.
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which the value of an option is its expected value on the supposition that it is
selected). Such theories include ones described in Ahmed (2014b), Gibbard
and Harper (1978), Jeffrey (1965), Joyce (1999), Lewis (1981), Skyrms (1980),
Stalnaker (1981), and many others.
So causal decision theorists must either answer “no” to one of the above
questions, or else abandon suppositional decision theories.
2 Suppositional decision theories
Many evidential and causal decision theories are unified by a guiding idea:
The value of an option is a weighted average of the values of the possibilities
compatible with that option. Weighted how? By the agent’s probability
function on the supposition that the option is realized.2
More precisely, these theories can all be expressed as the requirement
that one select an option A that maximizes
U(A) = E(v, PA) def= expectation of v with respect to PA,
where A ranges over one’s options (assumed to be disjoint propositions3), v
is one’s value function (a function from possible worlds to real numbers), and
PA is the result of starting with one’s probability function P and supposing
A. The function that maps P to PA is a supposition function, required only
to be such that for all probability functions P and all propositions A in the
domain of P, the following condition holds: PA is a probability function
with PA(A) = 1. Different decision theories understand the supposition
function in different ways. Call theories in this family suppositional decision
2I learned of this unification from Joyce (1999), which explicitly formulates a supposi-
tional decision theory that has evidential and causal decision theories as special cases. See
also Lewis (1981).
3I assume throughout that propositions are sets of possible worlds and that probability
functions are defined over a suitable algebra of propositions.
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theories.4
Prominent and popular suppositional decision theories abound:
. Evidential Decision Theory (Jeffrey 1965) is gotten by letting the
supposition function be conditionalization: PA(·) = P(·|A).
. Counterfactual causal decision theories (Gibbard and Harper 1978,
Stalnaker 1981) are gotten by letting the supposition function be
counterfactual supposition: PA(·) = P(A ·).
. K-partition causal decision theories are defined in terms of a privi-
leged partition K of “dependency hypotheses”, each of which speci-
fies causal dependencies between options and outcomes.5 For such
theories, the supposition function is imaging relative to K: PA(·) =
ΣK∈KP(K)P(·|AK).6
In addition to the above, a wide range of decision theories count as
suppositional. For example, suppose that one takes a counterfactual-based
causal decision theory and replaces the normal counterfactual conditional
with another conditional satisfying a few undemanding constraints.7 The
4The above definition of a supposition function is slightly more permissive than the
one in Joyce (1999, Ch 6), in order to maximize the generality of the impossibility proof
below. There is some technical messiness associated with the case of P(A) = 0, orthogonal
to present concerns, that I am here ignoring.
5 Theories differ on the exact characterization of K, whose members are also sometimes
termed “states” or “act independent states” (see Joyce (1999, 165) for a survey). One
influential proposal has it that each member of K fully specifies “how the things [one] cares
about do and do not depend causally on [one’s] present actions” (Lewis 1981, 11). Note that
since each suppositional decision theory uses a single supposition function, a K-partition
theory counts as suppositional only if it entails that K-partitions for different decisions
always induce the same supposition function. I consider relaxing this assumption at the
end of §6.
6Here “AK” denotes the conjunction (intersection) of propositions A and K. The stated
definition of imaging assumes that the partition K is countable and that P is countably
additive, assumptions I adopt going forward.
7To ensure that a conditional induces an imaging function, it is sufficient that it be
a “centered conditional” (Joyce 1999, 64) which satisfies “Conditional Contradiction”,
“Harmony”, and “Conditional Excluded Middle” (Joyce 1999, 168).
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result would be another suppositional theory. Or suppose that one takes a
partition-based theory and modifies the partition of act-independent states.
Again the result would be a suppositional theory.
Though a wide range of decision theories count as suppositional, none
of them are consistent with answering “yes” to both of the questions at the
start of this paper. Or so I shall argue, by describing two cases.
3 Betting on the laws
Here is the first case:8
Betting on the laws Let D be the proposition that some particular deter-
ministic regularities are exceptionless9 laws of nature.10 For example,
D might be the proposition that the laws of nature include (a determin-
istic formulation of) Newtonian mechanics. Your total evidence favors
D over its negation, and so P(D) > 1/2, where P is your probability
function. You must choose between endorsing D by raising your
hand (option A1) and denying D by not doing so (option A2). You
are certain that your choice has no causal influence on whether D is
true or on the state of the world in the distant past. You care only
about endorsing truths and denying falsehoods on this occasion, as
reflected by your value function v1, pictured here:11
8This case due to Ahmed (2013), though I have changed some details. See also Ahmed
(2014b, Ch. 5).
9Why “exceptionless”? To close off the potential escape route of claiming that a system
of deterministic laws can obtain even though some violations of it occur (Braddon-Mitchell
2001).
10“Deterministic regularity” is here understood so that D, together which a full speci-
fication of the state of the world at any one time, entails a full specification of the state
of world at all times. States of the world are assumed to be rich enough so that any two
D-worlds whose states perfectly match at all times are alike with respect to which options
you choose at all times.
11This table represents no more than the following: that v1(w) = 1 for any world w in





One verdict seems obvious about this case:
Bet “Betting on the laws” situations are possible, and in any such situation
you should choose A1 (endorse D).
Even prior to one’s commitment to a particular decision theory, this
verdict should have significant appeal. For Bet to be false, either the
“Betting on the laws” situation would have to be impossible, or else it would
have to be that even though you reasonably have P(D) > 1/2 (and you
are sure that your bet has no causal influence on whether D is true), you
are not rationally required to bet that D is true. Neither option has much
independent appeal.12
4 Newcomb on the past
Here is the second case:13
Newcomb on the past Let H be the proposition that the truth about the
state of the world at the first moment of 1900, when conjoined with
D, entails that you raise your hand on the present occasion.14 The
name of a proposition represents negation.) Subsequent tables for value functions are to
be interpreted similarly. Note that unlike many decision tables, the “value tables” in this
paper are not meant to convey or presuppose that the partition of propositions labeling
the columns has any special status.
12This reasoning is similar in spirit to the defense of the “Causal Betting Principle” from
Ahmed (2013, 292).
13This is a variant of the “Betting on the past” case from Ahmed (2014a). See also Ahmed
(2014b, Ch. 5), Ahmed (2010, 123n5).
14 I assume that H is consistent with D. H is a proposition entirely about the state of
the world at the first moment of 1900. In particular, H neither entails D nor is entailed by
D. Instead, H is the set of worlds w such that: at every w′ ∈ D such that w and w′ are in
the same state at the first moment of 1900, you raise your hand (in the present situation).
(Compare Ahmed (2014a, 6).)
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proposition D, your options, and your probability function P are all
the same as they are in “Betting on the laws”, but your value function
v2 (pictured below) differs as follows.15 Here is all you care about:
. You greatly prefer that H be true (that is worth M utiles to you,
where M > 0).
. You slightly prefer that you not raise your hand (that is worth T




In this case the same sort of dominance reasoning supports A2 as
supports taking two boxes in a standard Newcomb problem (Nozick 1969).
Indeed, the above table represents the payoffs in a standard Newcomb
problem if one reads H as the proposition that the opaque box has $1 million,
M as one million, T as one thousand, and A1 and A2 as the options of taking
one or two boxes respectively.16
In a standard Newcomb problem there is a causal dominance argument
for taking two boxes: “The $1 million is either there or it is not, and you
have no causal influence on whether it is. Either way (and no matter what
else is true), taking two boxes gets you a better outcome than taking just
15Since in the two situations you have the same probability function but different value
functions, the setup entails that in at least one of the two situations you are ignorant
or incorrect about your value function. In response to the worry that such ignorance
compromises verdicts about what it is rational to do in the situations, there are at least
two options. (1) One might hold that rationality requires one to maximize expected utility
even when one is less than omniscient about one’s values. (2) One might model the whole
setup with probabilities defined over a space of “coarsened” elementary possibilities each
of which is silent about the subject’s values. Doing so would remove the need to say that
in either situation the subject is mistaken about her values.
16Here I impose the harmless idealization that you care only about the combination of
two factors: (1) whether the opaque box has $1 million, and (2) whether you take one or
two boxes.
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one. So you should take two boxes.” Generalized and made more precise,
the idea is that when choosing between A1 and A2 you should choose A2
whenever:
(a) You are certain you have no present influence over whether H is true.
(b) You strictly prefer every A2H world to every A1H world.
(c) You strictly prefer every A2H world to every A1H world.
These conditions are satisfied in “Newcomb on the past” just as much as
they are in a standard Newcomb problem. So those who are sympathetic to
the spirit of causal decision theory are under some pressure to endorse:
Two-box “Newcomb on the past” situations are possible, and in any such
situation you should choose A2.
5 Trouble for suppositional causal decision theories
Here is where the trouble begins. There are sound arguments that several
prominent counterfactual-based causal decision theories are committed to
denying Bet (Ahmed 2014a, §5), that a number of other decision theories
are similarly committed (Ahmed 2014a, §7), and that so are causal decision
theories that operate by way of a particular conception of “causal reach” or
objective chances (Ahmed 2014b, §5.2.1).
Still: the above arguments, however compelling, attempt to play a
game of whack-a-mole, ruling out theories one by one. So a friend of
causal decision theory might hope that some undreamt-of suppositional
decision theory is immune to the arguments and consistent with both Bet
and Two-box:
Suppositional Some suppositional decision theory—perhaps one yet to be
formulated—delivers correct verdicts about all “Betting on the laws”
and “Newcomb on the past” cases.
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Contrary to the above hope, however, the following proof shows that Bet,
Two-box, and Suppositional are jointly inconsistent.17
For the proof it will be convenient to have additional representations
of the value functions in “Betting on the laws” (v1) and “Newcomb on the
past” (v2):
v1 HD HD HD H D
A1 1 0 0
A2 1 0 1
v2 HD HD HD H D
A1 M M 0
A2 M+T T T
Note that any D-world in which you raise your hand is a member of H
(since any such world was in a state at the start of 1900 that together with D
entails that you raise your hand), and so A1HD = ∅. Similarly A2HD = ∅.
That is why the corresponding cells in the above tables have been left blank.
Suppose for contradiction that Bet, Two-box, and Suppositional are
true. Then by Suppositional, some suppositional decision theory delivers
correct verdicts about “Betting on the laws” and “Newcomb on the past”.
Since the subjects in those cases have the same probability function P, we
may write the values of the suppositional probabilities of this theory for
both cases as follows:18
HD HD HD H D
PA1 a b 0 c
PA2 0 d e f
where a through f are real numbers in the unit interval, a + b + c = 1
= d + e + f (by the definition of a supposition function), and the 0 entries
are forced because A2HD = A1HD = ∅.
17Compare to the “Bonus Newcomb Problem” argument in Solomon (2019, §4).
18This table represents no more than that PA1(HD) = a, PA1(HD) = b, . . . , PA2(H D) = f .
In particular it does not represent that any of HD, HD, HD, or H D are dependency
hypotheses.
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On the one hand, by Bet and Suppositional:
E(v1, PA2) < E(v1, PA1)
d + f < a. (1)
On the other hand, by Two-box and Suppositional, for all M, T > 0:
E(v2, PA1) < E(v2, PA2)
Ma + Mb < (M + T)d + Te + T f
M(a + b− d) < T(d + e + f )
a + b− d < T/M Since d + e + f = 1
a + b− d ≤ 0 By continuity of the reals
a ≤ d− b. (2)
Combining (1) and (2) we have that d + f < d − b, and hence that
f + b < 0. But that contradicts the assumption that f and b are each
nonnegative.
6 Which assumption should be rejected?
In the face of the above result, decision theorists must reject at least one of
Bet, Two-box, and Suppositional. How might each rejection be motivated?
Start with Bet. One way to reject Bet is to claim that when determinism
is true, one’s present choice does have causal influence over what laws of
nature obtain. Bales (2017, §4.3.1) expresses sympathy with this thought,
assuming a deflationary Humean analysis of the laws of nature.
A second way is to give up causal decision theory (strictly so-called)
in favor of “non-backtracking counterfactual dependence decision theory”
(Hitchcock 2013, 139). One could then reject Bet on the grounds that
one’s present choice has not causal but “non-backtracking counterfactual”
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influence over what laws of nature obtain.19
Turn now to Two-box. Evidential decision theorists are of course happy
to reject it. But in addition, inspired by Dorr (2016) and Loewer (Unpub-
lished) one might argue as follows: No attractive theory of counterfactuals
entails (roughly speaking) that both the past and the laws are counterfactu-
ally independent of one’s present actions. Given this conflict, we should
adopt a “causal-counterfactual” decision theory backed by a species of coun-
terfactual according to which the laws are counterfactually independent of
one’s present actions, but the past is not. Such analyses of counterfactuals
can be motivated by statistical mechanics (Albert 2000, 2015, Kutach 2002,
Loewer 2007). The resulting decision theory would underwrite the denial
of Two-box. Furthermore, any counterintuitiveness of rejecting Two-box
should be tolerated because the subject in “Newcomb on the past” has such
eccentric values.20
Another way to reject Two-box is to adopt a hybrid theory that rejects
causal dominance reasoning in some special cases (such as “Newcomb on
the past”) while endorsing a version of it in many others. To arrive at such a
theory one might exclude “unreachable” possibilities from expected utility
calculations. For example, Sandgren and Williamson (forthcoming) spells
out a way of excluding conjunctions of acts and dependency hypotheses
thought to be inconsistent with the laws of nature.21 And Kment (Unpub-
lished) proposes (roughly) to calculate the utility of each option by first
conditionalizing on this claim: that choosing that option is compatible with
all truths beyond the decision-maker’s causal influence.
19In particular one might endorse the a version of the partition-based decision theory of
Lewis (1981) in which causal dependence is replaced by counterfactual dependence, and
counterfactuals are given a “miracles” semantics (Lewis 2014).
20Here I mirror the discussion of the “Lavinia” case in Dorr (2016, 267).
21Note that the theory in Sandgren and Williamson (forthcoming) is not intended to
on its own handle cases like “Betting on the laws”. Rather it is intended to be deployed
alongside strategies that reject Suppositional (Sandgren and Williamson forthcoming,
n. 19, Williamson and Sandgren forthcoming, §6).
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Another way to reject either Bet or Two-box is to argue that the cases
figuring in them are not genuine decisions. Assume that the causal relations
between acts and outcomes in any genuine decision can be represented by a
suitable partition of dependency hypotheses. Then to show that a situation
fails to be a genuine decision it is enough to show that no suitable partition
exists. Joyce (2016, 225) and Williamson and Sandgren (forthcoming, §5.2.1)
pursue this line, offering arguments that no partitions suitably represent
“Newcomb on the past” and “Betting on the laws” respectively. In each
instance candidate partitions are rejected because they violate an “Act-State
Independence Principle” according which dependency hypotheses are
counted as counterfactually independent of options.22
The above authors only argue against a restricted range of candidate
partitions.23 That leaves it open that a partition outside of that range might
be adequate. But an argument in the spirit of Solomon (2019, §2.1) suggests
that casting a wider net is unlikely to help.
To begin the argument, recall (from the discussion of K-partition theories
in §2) that there is a canonical way for a partition of propositions to
induce (determine) a supposition function. So we can impose constraints
on partitions by imposing constraints to the supposition functions that
they induce. Next note that causal decision theorists often enjoin us to
22In fact Joyce (2016) addresses “Betting on the past” (Ahmed 2014a), but similar
considerations apply to “Newcomb on the past”. “Act-state Independence” is Williamson
and Sandgren’s term; Joyce’s principle N2 is similar (224). Note also that Williamson and
Sandgren offer the above argument as just one of several alternative strategies, and that
Joyce’s view is more nuanced than the one described above, addressing not “genuine
decisions” but rather “genuine Newcomb problems”. What matters most in the present
context is the denial that “Newcomb on the past” is the sort of decision to which a causal
dominance argument applies (226). Such a denial would be a reason to reject Two-box.
23Joyce (2016) considers just the partition {HD, HD, HD, H D} (notation adapted to the
present context). The argument in Williamson and Sandgren (forthcoming) assumes (n. 3)
that each conjunction of a dependency hypothesis and an option entails a unique outcome,
and so does not cover indeterministic cases. It also assumes a “miracles” semantics for
counterfactuals (Lewis 2014), and does not cover other sorts of counterfactuals, or other
ways of characterizing dependency hypotheses.
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compare options while holding fixed our opinions about matters beyond
our influence. In a suppositional decision theory, doing so amounts to
treating a proposition as suppositionally independent of your choice whenever
you are certain that you have no causal influence on its truth.24
Now turn to “Betting on the laws” and “Newcomb on the past”. In
those cases you are certain that your choice has neither causal influence on
the truth of H nor causal influence on the truth of D. So in modeling the
cases it is natural to require a supposition function such that given your
probability function P:
1. H is suppositionally independent of your choice, and
2. D is suppositionally independent of your choice.
Unfortunately, given that P(D) > 1/2 we can prove that no such supposition
function meets those conditions.25 It follows that no partition induces a
supposition function that meets those conditions. That is reason to think
that no partition of dependency hypotheses adequately represents both
cases.
In the light of this result one might reject Bet or Two-box on grounds that
“Betting on the past” or “Newcomb on the laws” are not genuine decisions.
Alternatively, one might assume that the cases are genuine decisions and
take the above argument as a reason to reject Suppositional.
24Definition: Proposition X is suppositionally independent of your choice (relative to P)
if for each of your options A, your probability for X remains unchanged by supposing
A: PA(X) = P(X). Solomon (2019, §2.1) motivates the requirement that propositions
causally independent of your choice are suppositionally independent of it, and applies that
requirement to propositions about the past and the laws of nature. The above definition of
suppositional independence is slightly more demanding than the definition suggested by
Joyce (1999, 162), but the two notions coincide for supposition functions determined by a
K-partition.
25Proof: let P ·(·) be the result of applying an arbitrary supposition function to your
probability function P in “Betting on the laws” or “Newcomb on the past”. Specify the
values of P ·(·) as in the last table of §5. We will show that if conditions (1) and (2) are
satisfied, then P(D) ≤ 1/2. By (1), PA1(H) = P(H) = PA2(H) and so a+ b = P(H) = d+ 0.
By (2), PA1(D) = P(D) = PA2(D) and so a + 0 = P(D) = 0 + e. By the definition of a
supposition function, d + e + f = 1. Using the substitutions d = a + b and e = a in this
sum, we have (a + b) + a + f = 1, so a = 1/2− b/2− f /2 ≤ 1/2. Hence a = P(D) ≤ 1/2.
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How might Suppositional be rejected? Bales (2017, 122–124) hopes
for an attractive new decision theory consistent with analogs of Bet and
Two-box, while cautioning that coming up with a suitable theory “might
be a substantive challenge and might require substantial changes to ex-
isting accounts”. Benchmark theory (Wedgwood 2013) is a notable non-
suppositional decision theory consistent with Bet and Two-box, though it
faces its own challenges (especially the proposed counterexample in Bassett
(2015, §4.1)).
Other approaches for rejecting Suppositional include adopting a species
of counterfactual whose semantics involves impossible worlds (Nolan
2017, Schwarz 2014, Williamson and Sandgren forthcoming, §5.1.1), and
interpreting rigidified descriptions in novel ways (Williamson and Sandgren
forthcoming, §5.2). Both approaches give up fairly fundamental framework
assumptions, so their ultimate attractiveness will depend on whether
alternative foundations can be constructed to support them.
A final approach worth exploring is a theory in which different sup-
position functions operate in different contexts.26 Such a theory might
recommend both that an agent facing “Betting on the laws” treat the laws
(but not the distant past) as suppositionally independent of her present
choice and that an agent facing “Newcomb on the past” treat the distant
past (but not the laws) as suppositionally independent of her present choice.
A challenge for this approach is to specify exactly how the appropriate
supposition function depends on what decision an agent faces. It is not
obvious how to do so in general, especially for hybrid choice situations that
combine elements of “Betting on the laws” and “Newcomb on the past”.
26This was independently suggested to me (but not endorsed) by Chris Meacham and
Chris Register. A similar suggestion is considered but rejected by Solomon (2019, n. 21).
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7 Conclusion
There are viable ways to reject each of Bet, Two-box, and Suppositional.
Each way faces its own challenges and I won’t try to choose between them
here. But as a causal decision theorist I must confess: the independent
appeal of each premise makes me wish I did not have to choose.27
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